Introduction
The analysis of quantitative data has played an important role in peace research ever since Richardson's use of measures of military expenditures and frequency of war. Formal statistical methods are the 'language' we use to discuss such data. This is an essential language, since people have great difficulty with probabilities and tend to make elementary mistakes unless they use formal methods -which means learning the language. Unfortunately, statistics is quite a difficult language, so learners tend to focus on mastering the rules of grammar and syntax, at the expense of the meaning of what is being said.1 There is a process of goal displacement from the substantive issues of peace research to the application of the rules. The literature reflects this, being excessively * I am grateful to the editor of JPR for persuading me to write this article, to 15 editorial committee members and other JPR referees for responding to an earlier version and to Kristian S. Gleditsch for guiding my further reading in quantitative peace research.
T his metaphor I owe to Ed Leamer, who used it about econometrics.
technique oriented, emphasizing the mechanical application of rules.2 It seems to me that authors would benefit not from arguing about what the right rules may be, but from trying to ask themselves the right questions. When you start writing of course it helps to have rules -do not split infinitives, do not end sentences with prepositions -but later it is more useful to have style manuals that can suggest questions to help you judge whether your grammar and syntax work to convey the meaning effectively: is 'to boldly go' the right note to start Star Trek on? Below, I suggest some questions that authors of quantitative work might ask themselves. Though in principle asking these questions should be taken for granted, in practice they bear regular repetition. I make no claim for originality; most of these are taught in introductory statistics courses, although they are often forgotten by the time one obtains a 420 journal of PEACE RESEARCH PhD. My prejudice against rule-based procedures is also common in statistics, where rule-based teaching is widely disparaged as 'cook book' courses. This is unfair to real cook books, which are usually much better than such courses in emphasizing the importance of the objective of the recipe, the need to adjust the recipe to the quality of the ingredients (data) and to the implements (statistical methods) available.
Most of these points are also made in King (1989) .3 I use King as a reference partly because it is good on these issues and partly because it is a statistics book written by a political scientist rather than an economist. Judging from citations, many peace researchers use econometrics texts for reference. This is unfortunate partly because peace research data are often very different from economic data and partly because most econometrics texts adopt the wrong approach: listing tricks to fix the error terms to make the assumptions hold, rather than emphasizing the need to specify the model correctly. King (1989: 251) also criticizes the assumption-violation-correction strategy taught in most econometrics texts.
After a little discussion of methodology, the main part of my article provides some questions and a discussion of their importance. I shall follow the economics convention and distinguish methods, herein the use of particular statistical techniques, from methodology, which is the philosophical basis for those methods. I shall also use some conventions to avoid the ambiguities associated with the word 'statistics'. Statistics may be used to mean data (I will use the term 'data'); to mean functions of the observed data (I will use the terms 'estimates' or 'tests'); to mean the academic discipline concerned with methods for making inferences from data (which is how I will use the term); and finally, statistics is a branch of mathematics (which I will call mathematical statistics). The latter distinction is important, since many appear confused about what are mathematical derivations, on which we tend to agree, and what are questions about methods of inference, on which we may justifiably disagree. For instance, while we may all agree that probabilities are numbers that satisfy three axioms (an issue of mathematical statistics), we may disagree on how to estimate a particular empirical probability (an issue of statistical inference). Similarly, we may agree on the basis of mathematical statistics that a particular estimator is unbiased but disagree on whether unbiasedness is a desirable property for an estimator in a particular case.
Methodological Issues
What we are doing when we do quantitative work? At first sight this appears to be a process of induction, of seeking to infer general laws from particular observations. However, since at least Hume, it has been realized that there exists no philosophical basis for induction. Suppose that no two democracies have ever been observed to go to war: this provides no philosophical basis for concluding that we will not observe a war between democracies tomorrow. If we have a strong theoretical explanation for the observations (e.g. reasons why war between democracies is impossible), we may have more confidence that the relationship is structural or permanent, but we still cannot be sure. The structural stability, over time or space, of estimated relationships is thus a crucial statistical question.4 In general, confidence in the structural stability of relationships is much less in the social sciences than in the physical sciences. In some cases, the theory tells us that empirical relationships should not be stable. In economics, the Lucas critique argues that estimated behavioural parameters should reflect how people form their expectations. If something causes people to change the way they form their expectations, a change in policy regime for instance, then the estimated behavioural parameters will change, making the estimated model useless for predicting the effect of a policy change. However, the theory may suggest stability at a meta-level. The Lucas critique, for instance, implies that there should be a stable relationship between the way behavioural and expectation formation parameters move (see Alogoskoufis & Smith 1991) .
Given the problems with induction, Popper proposed a more limited aim: falsification. If we cannot prove a theory true, at least we can potentially disprove it. However, this also runs into difficulties, in particular the Duhem-Quine problem: any particular prediction is a mixture of a core theoretical statement and auxiliary assumptions (for instance, about exactly how democracy and war should be measured). Thus, we cannot know whether what has been disproved is the theory or the auxiliary assumptions. Since most quantitative models involve a very large number of auxiliary assumptions (about parametric functional forms, stochastic specification, etc.), rejection is rarely robust. When we apply statistical tests, what we are almost invariably testing are characteristics of specific models, not theories.
Statisticians usually claim a much more modest methodological basis for their procedures. The usual basis is instrumental: how to use prior information and the available data to make 'better' decisions. 'Better' is evaluated in terms of the consequences of the decision to the decision-maker. To use an example to illustrate statistical procedures, you want to decide when to leave for the airport. You have prior views about how covariates (time of day, season) influence travel time and a series of observations on how long it took in the past. You make an estimate of the time required, and the outcome is that you either miss your plane or sit in the airport lounge -each of which involves costs or losses. The best estimate minimizes those expected losses. Since your loss function is probably asymmetrical, an unbiased estimate would not be sensible: missing your plane half the time is unlikely to be optimal. The consequences can be expressed either in terms of a loss-function, e.g. some cost attached to the difference between an estimate and outcome, or as in the standard Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing framework in terms of costs attached to type I and type II errors.
The difficulty is that in most academic quantitative work neither the decisions nor the costs associated with the consequences of the decision are apparent. Thus academics tend to fall back on ritualistic conventions, such as quadratic loss functions and setting the size of the test (probability of type I error) at 5%. These conventions may have historical explanations and may provide a point of reference, but there is no reason to expect them to be appropriate for every situation. They are certainly not 'absolute scientific criteria', since they can be justified only in terms of the consequences of particular decisions.
The instrumental or decision-theoretic framework suggests that we interpret the authors of quantitative work as having some purpose, a substantive question that they wish to answer by using the available data; some prior information (usually expressed in theory) which they embody in a mathematical model of how the data were generated. Many articles give the impression that the authors have applied the statistical procedures without looking at the data. This is particularly a problem with large datasets. Since mistakes in standard data sources (coding errors, misplaced decimal points, etc.) are fairly common, the probability is that many statistically significant results are a product of data errors. We do not have good estimates on the frequency, since so few articles are replicated. My experience from getting graduate students to replicate articles as part of their training is that data errors are common, although they usually do not change the substantive conclusions. Again, graphical methods are a good way of discovering data errors.
What Is the Prior Probability of Your
Model? This is primarily a question of theory; showing that prior information about the process that generated the data would lead to a model of that particular form.6 To put it differently, authors need to convince the reader that their model is a plausible representation of the substantive process. A whole range of aspects of the model might need to be justified, such as: the structural stability of the parameters (why should the action-reaction coefficients in an arms race model be constant over time?), the exogeneity of the independent variables (why does the causation go from democracy to peace, not from peace to democracy?) and the particular stochastic structure (why normality?). Most statistical models were developed for quite specific purposes: regression for eugenic concerns, the theory of censored and truncated distri- King (1989) butions to determine where to put the armour on World War II US aircraft. They can be transferred to other purposes, but then the author will need to convince the reader that the model can answer the substantive question; that the model represents what we know about the process that generates the data being analysed. Instead, authors tend to emphasize that their technique has been widely used to analyse a different type of data in another subject. The mechanical application of statistical models which do not describe the data can give nonsense results, as has been well known since at least Yule (1926) .
The plausibility of the model for the process is a serious problem in peace research because the data-generation processes, how the data were constructed, are often quite complicated -measures like dyad war years. The standard procedure in this case is to construct a model of the underlying (often unobserved) process and then a model of how the observations were generated; see e.g. King (1989: 110, 116) . To return to the Presidential Approval example, the series used is not a time-series but is closer to a dynamic panel, because it splices together the approval for different presidents. The computational problems this causes (you cannot use lagged dependent variables or lagged errors when presidents change) are discussed in the literature. I have not, however, seen a discussion of the fact that the basic statistical theory used to justify the properties of dynamic models employed, such as ARDL or ARIMA, does not apply. Not only is the series made up of realizations of different random variables, but it is not clear what initial observations you condition on, or how you motivate the asymptotics.7 Given that 7 The asymptotics should probably be large N fixed 7T rather than large Tas is usually assumed; i.e. we look at the properties of the estimators as we increase the number of presidents, keeping the incumbency period fixed, rather than letting incumbency go to infinity. 1995) . In that symposium, Nagler (1995) gives excellent advice on procedures which will make it more likely that you will be able to reproduce your own results. A range of journals, including the JPR, have made various efforts to make replication easier, for instance by making it a publication requirement that the data be available on a website where they can be downloaded by others. But this has not changed the incentives for replication and, thus, the incentives to avoid mistakes. When I use articles for teaching, the students who pore through them find many mistakes. Most of them are minor, as were the majority of those discovered by Dewald et al. (1986) . In such cases, experienced academics can say the expression is indeed wrong, but it doesn't matter; however, the mistakes live on in the literature. Sometimes mistakes can be major. In my own work, Smith (1980b), on the demand for military expenditure, contains a major mistake, one which changed the interpretation of the results and which could be easily discovered from the information in the paper. Although the paper was widely cited nobody checked the algebra, until one of my students did. Smith (1987) corrects that particular problem.
How Much Would You Bet on the Predictions of This Model?
This is an economist's question, because the purpose of many (though not all) economics
